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Jan Hartman
The concept of certainty and its correlates: truthulness and
evidence
(an introductory analysis)
This paper is giong to be published in 2004 by Rodopi in
Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the
Humanities in the volume under my editorial care and devoted to Jan Woleński
Assumptions underlying the analysis of the certainty of
knowledge
Two venues can be adopted in order to analyse the certainty
of knowledge: the autonomous and the instrumental approach. The autonomous
approach means that the issues related to the certainty of knowledge arouse our
cognitive curiosity. In effect they are considered because of the value of study
itself. We feel the need of finding out what entity is endowed with the
property of “certainty”. What is the nature of this property? Can it be graded?
On the other hand, in the instrumental approach to the analysis of “certainty”,
the interpretation of this property’s nature is subordinated to the possible
application of obtained knowledge about certainty to assess individual cognition
results, or to formulate certain methodological directives for the scientific
procedure. In the instrumental approach to the study of certainty, the results
would be satisfactory only in the case when - on the basis of inherent criteria
- the very analysis is found to provide certain knowledge (about certainty), i.e.
the relation is reflexive.
It would be prudent to tackle the issue of certainty from the
autonomous viewpoint. Thus, we would not need to prove that our solutions are
reflexive. The reflexivity means that they could be applied to themselves. They
would be certain according to the interpretation of certainty that they offer.
It does not mean that we plan to ignore the peculiarities resulting of the fact
that the words “certain” or “true” appear in the statements formulating (on the
basis of meta-theory or any level of meta-language) the cognitive evaluation of
individual cognition acts, or statements expressing cognition results. To the
contrary, the iterative character of the statement such as: “it is certain that”
(“it is certain that it is certain that it is certain...”), “it is obvious that”
or “it is true that” and the related redundancy quality (“inflation” allowing to
leave out the predicate i.e. “deflation” without the loss of the semantic
nucleus of communication, its cognitive value or credibility) is characteristic
for such predicates. It belongs to their crucial attributes responsible for the
extreme difficulty of the study of truth, evidence (obviousness) and certainty.
Nothing significant can be said in the study of these problems, without the
exposition of the notions of iterability, redundancy, and reflexivity (the
statement proclaiming the truthfulness, certainty or evidence of another
statement or judgement inherent in it, shows itself as true, certain or obvious,
or otherwise devoid of the capacity to communicate its sense) of epistemological
predicates at stake and their mutual relations. The crucial ideas underlying
present study (specified in part III) have been inspired by the above conviction,
which can be precisely formulated in following assumed conditions:
No ultimate or universal statements can be made about the
sense and object of the predicates “true”, “obvious” and “certain”, since they
are mutually relative. They form a dynamic and changeable functional entity (changing
in effect of the applied discourse type, the assumptions and preferences
selected by the language user). The functional character of this entity
results of its epistemological features, i.e. knowledge-generation and
knowledge-transfer, as well as explanatory and persuasive characteristics. In
general, such functions can be defined as pragmatic. In consequence, this
functional entity can be described only. Besides, it can be shown that various
strategies of applying relevant words (either consciously or unconsciously -
as it is the case in explicit “concepts of truth”, consequently or not quite
consequently - the latter being more frequent) lead to various conceptual
configurations, and in various venues display the same set of peculiarities (reflexivity,
redundancy, iterability).
The application of the concept of truth, evidence and
certainty is always more or less directly related to the intention of the
legitimisation of proclaimed statements. This fact leads to important
consequences that must be always remembered. Firstly, the words “true”, “certain”,
“evident”, applied in situations when a threat of falsity (of some type)
appears, always serve to some degree the persuasive (i.e. rhetoric) function.
Nietzsche and some of his contemporary followers managed to build a complete
theory of truth on this basis. A crucial result of this theory consists in a
convincing demonstration that the persuasive feature reflects the imperfect
nature of all knowledge available to humans. In some
à rebours way, it is compensated by
assurances (however legitimate, but offering no more than just assurance)
that “given statement is true rather than false”, “it is certain, rather than
dubious”, “it is obvious, rather than unclear or non-obvious”. In a proverbial
way this situation can be summarised by the statement that God does not need
the concepts of truth, certainty or evidence. Secondly, the natural use of the
terms “true”, “certain” and “evident” is linked to legitimisation of
statements. In consequence, the special way of using these words pertinent e.g.
to the formulation of the theories of truth, certainty and evidence must be
related to the procedure of statement legitimisation and the reflection over
the problem of legitimacy. In result, the problem of the perspectives of
judgement legitimisation (i.e. the issue of the possible ultimate
legitimisation of knowledge - Letzbergündung - and scepticism)
supplements naturally the problem of truth (certainty or evidence), as long as
the latter question is formulated radically, i.e. in expectation that the
cognisance of the essence of truth is accompanied by the cognisance of the
ultimate perspectives of human ascertainment in relation to formulated
statements. In this radical formulation of the issue of truth (radical though
also natural, since the claim of absolute certainty is natural in all
situations when any claim to the ascertainment of the truth of given
statement appears) the difference is partly obliterated between the above
defined autonomous and instrumental approaches. The certainty, evidence and
truth of the theory of truth must have possibly many common points with the
properties discussed in this theory. Its criterion-generating value is always
desirable. Similarly, in the natural application of language, it is desirable
to get explicit knowledge about the meaning and the bases of statements
claiming that given judgement is true, certain or evident.
The specification of issues related to the certainty of
knowledge and correlate properties
The selection of the problem of certainty as the foundation
on which the epistemological concept can be built, embracing all the inherently
inter-related issues connected with the certainty of knowledge, its truth or
evidence, is essentially arbitrary. To some degree, it is justified by the fact
that the awareness, and the following philosophical conceptualisation, of our
natural claims to the truth of cognisance results lead the philosopher - always
eager to persuade ultimately himself and others about the defended position - to
everyday encounters with the problems of knowledge legitimacy, and thus directly
also with the issue of certainty. Having perpetrated this partly arbitrary and
partly justified choice, let us try to define the problem domain, where the
reliable concept of certainty/truth/evidence should be localised. The ambition
of present study is to offer only a very rough outline of such concept. However,
if this rough outline were to be developed into detailed analysis, the questions
to be answered (i.e. the minimum number of questions, since very many other ones
could be formulated) should include the following:
What does it mean that an act or cognitive procedure yields
certain (or true, or evident) knowledge? Is it exclusively and always
knowledge?
What does it mean that a judgement and a statement
formulate knowledge that is certain?
Is the certainty (or evidence, or truth) an experience (mental
object), a property or a relation?
Is the certainty (or evidence) of knowledge a warranty of
its essential value (truthulness?) in general, or is it the ultimate cognition
value in itself?
Do the criteria of statement certainty exist, and if so,
are they different from the criteria of statement truthulness? (Can evidence
be interpreted as a criterion?)
Is the formulation “certain (or true) knowledge” not a
pleonasm? Is it possible for knowledge to be uncertain (untrue) and remain
knowledge?
The iterations of the type “it is certain that it is
certain that...” or “it is certain that it is true that it is certain that...”
etc. - are they purely redundant (inflationary), or do they define any values?
What is the opposite of certainty? What does it mean that
the opinion, statement or cognitive experience, contain uncertain elements? In
particular, do “uncertainty” and “mere possibility” denote the same quality?
Does the notion of certainty belong to the vocabulary of
pragmatic rationality, referring to the criteria of accepting statements and
opinions? Alternatively, is it a strictly epistemological entity referring to
the value of opinions in their relations to the world or other opinions? In
the former option, would it be different from the notion of truthulness?
Is the experience of cognitive certainty a cognition act in
itself? If so, what are the given elements in such act? To what object is it
related?
The certain knowledge: is it necessarily unchangeable,
subject to no correction (e.g. from the viewpoint of interpretation form)?
What is the relation between the notions of a priori
necessity, analytical truthulness, and certainty? The notion of certainty when
referred to formal sciences and analytically true statements: can it be
identified with the notion of certainty when referred to empirical cognition
acts? Is the latter application possible at all?
The certain knowledge: is it exclusively obtained in
scholarly research? Alternatively, can it be reached in everyday cognisance
experience or in any other field of cognitive activity?
The theses
Certainty is neither the property of cognitive experience nor
the property (feature) of the cognising subject or judgements or tasks.
Certainty is not a property in the strict meaning of this term (though in some
essential way it is related both to experience and judgements). The way
in which the property can constitute the substratum to which it pertains is
quite different from the relation between certainty and the certain. For
instance, the hypothetical deprivation of a given judgement of its certainty
does not modify its properties, as it would occur in the case of similar
operation performed on its syntactic structure (belonging to the group of
judgement properties). Certainty seems to “penetrate” the certain in way
comparable to existence “penetrating” the existing (while not being its
property). Also being recognised, certainty “penetrates” the related experience
in which we become sure of the existence of something.
The essence of certainty (and truthulness) cannot be pondered
in abstraction from the consideration of the certain conceived in its
content, i.e. in abstraction from the question: what do we know ultimately and
certainly? These problems essentially partake in the fundamental aspirations of
human reason (science), which can be seen as the effort to achieve general
ontology (or metaphysics). Yet, in epistemology we are excused for limiting our
analysis to the context of the formation and formulation of knowledge. I believe
that in this specific epistemological context certainty ought to be conceived as
a semiotic (pragmatic) relationship between the following statements: “The
statement p proclaims certain knowledge” (equivalent to the statement “it is
certain that p”, i.e. C(p)), and p. This relationship can
be summarised as follows: if the statement proclaiming the truth of p is
true, any further analysis of the truthulness of p is redundant. Of
course the corroboration of above relationship is tantamount to the finding of
truth in p since the corroboration of the truth of p is the only
way to test the truthulness of the statement: “it is true that p”. The
semiotic analysis of the terms “true” and “evident” is similar to the above
consideration of the term “certain”.
The definition (ii) is consciously an explanation of
ignotum per ignotum type. The justification is that the word “certain” (similarly
to the term “existing” and especially the term “is”) has no definite meaning,
while the way (and purpose) of its usage is such that the term is meant to lead
us, or more precisely, persuades us to focus on the content of a certain
cognitive experience or the content of a certain statement, which is meant to
certify its validity per se (i.e. by its very content). Similarly, the
existence (and the “is” word used to communicate this condition) is often
subject to such deictic reference to “the thing in itself”, which is meant to
proclaim itself, i.e. reveal its existence. From the object viewpoint such
“self-testimony of given thing” or its “self-justification” is tantamount to
so-called ontic truth, or simply the reality. From the subject’s viewpoint the
confirmation of experience validity (through the course of experience itself, or
through immanent reflection “I cannot be mistaken as to the fact that I do see
something being red in hue”, which can be generalised into an epistemological
law to the effect that “it is not possible to be mistaken about the content of
current cognitive experience”) is related to the mind’s self-assurance (or the
“aperception unity”, if we were to use a more sublime term).
The property of self-supporting of the validity by the
content of experience or statement itself is defined as its evidence,
while in strict consideration (when the terms “validity” or “general application”
are used) the validity (or general applicability) is attributed to the statement
or experience as its inherent (substantial) property. On the other hand the
evidence relates to the relation occurring between the valid statement and the
subject cognising its content (which becomes evident for the subject and ipso
facto valid). Similarly, the definition of relation occurring between the
content of valid statement or experience on the one hand and its referred object
on the other, is the truthulness. Yet, the conceptual and language
strategies serving the description of a given epistemic situation can vary
significantly (i.e. divergent ontologies describe the relation of cognising
subject, the subjective acts, their content, the subject and the object of
cognition). Similarly, various strategies can be applied when using the terms
and words, which are meant to “contribute jointly” to explain the complex
meanings related to the legitimacy claims of cognisance. In my opinion, no
reasons can be identified to argue about the validity of selected definitions of
truth or certainty conceived in abstraction. Rather, it should be studied
whether a given theory describes satisfactorily and comprehensively the
epistemic relations. The precise definition of such concepts as “truth”, “certainty”,
“evidence”, etc. provides but one of the methodological means for construction
of epistemological theory. It is misused when such solutions are considered
crucial for given research position and defining its characteristics. In
alternative formulation:
All such quality definitions as certainty, evidence,
truthulness (in various ethnic variations and relying on different philosophical
concepts) acquire meaningfulness within statements that project selected
relations between them. Such relations reflect the ontic relationships between
the relevant beings (subject, act, content, object, etc.). In consequence, the
serious epistemological discussion cannot avoid the area of cognising subject
ontology. It is worth noticing that one of the epistemological terms (e.g.
certainty) must always play the role of intentional or focal
“functor” - directing the attention to the own content of statement or
experience, as self-corroborating, while other terms are used in sentences that
express epistemic evaluations (e.g. “truthulness evaluations”) of other
sentences.
In result, the statements formulated in iv above
concerning the concepts of certainty, truth, validity and evidence have but
relative value, since the present theses do not go beyond the status of the
concept selected from many other possible concepts delineating the application
strategy of mentioned terms. Yet, this strategy has one outstanding quality. It
allows the clear understanding that the concepts of truth, certainty, etc.
always belong to a certain complex concept system allowing to formulate
statements at least both in primary and second-order language (i.e. they belong
to the reflective discourse). Thus, also the substantial correlates of such
predicates as “certain” or “true”, and consequently “truth” or “certain
knowledge” shall always have the character of conceptual projects, derived from
definite philosophical theories. Ultimately, these conceptual projects will have
been developed within the framework of theory pertaining to exactly this type of
notions, i.e. the particular “theories of truth” or the “the concepts of
evidence”.
If it is possible to discuss truth or certainty etc. only in
terms of concepts pertaining to particular “theories of truth” or “theories of
certainty” etc., it is useless to cherish aspirations of absolute nature and
transcending the limits of particular theories. The essence of truth and
certainty cannot be understood “in general”. They must be conceived “on the
grounds of a specific theory”. Emphatically, the above statements cannot be
reduced to relativism (formulated as follows: “truth and certainty are
always predicates having the sense conceived within the limits of definite
theory of truth and certainty, ergo absolute truth does not exists”).
Instead, it is the consequence of statements offered in (i) above. When
the concept of certainty and the related concept of truth are considered, at
some point a reference to the “very thing”, i.e. the individual content of
experience or statement must appear. One of the terms in the group: “truth”,
“evidence ”, “certainty” must adopt the role of “intentional functor”. In effect,
the concept definition will necessarily include a redundancy, ignotum per
ignotum, or another form of auto-reference.
Discussion of exemplary statements aspiring to certainty
The concept of certainty appears in various paradigmatic
contexts. To some degree, the application rules of the predicate “certain” (and
the correlated predicates “true”, “obvious”, “valid”) are biding also on the
ground of philosophical analysis. In such analysis transition is made from
standard statements, containing the studied terms, to a special type of
statements, which form the theory of something (e.g. the theory of
certainty, etc). The statements in which problems are formulated and studied in
a particular way must legitimise the ultimate declarations, which form the
theory. In reverse direction: the theory must shed a new light upon the sense of
these introductory statements (supplement or comment it, and in specific cases
even undermine it). That is why it is useful to study some characteristic
statements, or communication situations, in which the term “certain” appears (alongside
the related terms quoted above). The discussion of such examples shall be guided
by the understanding of the certainty of knowledge that has been outlined in the
offered theses, providing also the introductory verification (or perhaps
only self-promotion) of their correctness and operational character.
“I have seen him a moment ago, so certainly he will not
answer your phone call at his home telephone now (he is not at home)”. This
statement reflects the simple empirical impossibility: no one can cover such
long distance in such short time. What is meant here by certainty is such an
evaluation of probability that denies that the event is “only possible” and
claims this event is impossible: “It is impossible that your phone call finds
him at home now.” The truth of the former part of the compound statement (“I
have seen...”) guarantees the exclusion of condition defined in latter part (the
relevant person being at home now); it is beyond any reasonable measure of
probability. It is characteristic for this type of statements that they reject
a priori all chance of negation. Though essentially some probability
does exist that in future certain processes shall develop quite differently
from the past experience. The “possibility of miracles” cannot be absolutely
excluded. This indifference to the possibility of miraculous event (which
would undermine the unshaken belief in empirical observation based on
incomplete induction reasoning relying on innumerable amount of past cases)
should not be seen as pure rejection of negligible probability. Instead, it is
tantamount to the conviction that any events other than the foreseen one are
absolutely out of question. This sort of a priori certainty rejecting
all negation is an experience. Yet, it seems to contain a significant
epistemological claim, which can be paraphrased as follows: “the certainty
that a cube of sugar dissolves in a cup of hot tea is unshaken by any
imagination (possible in a nightmare) that something different might occur.
Essentially it boils down to my own certainty about my personality, integral
and sensible character of my own experience, memory and orientation in world.”
The certainty of statements similar to above example depends on a certain
functional quality that can be attributed to human mind (i.e. our cognitive
life). This quality is expressed most significantly in the fact that our mind
is prone to believe in its faculties, relies on its own convictions and
provides authority for itself. This functional quality can be seen as the
mind’s self-assurance. It is to this self-assurance that we
appeal by adding the ascertaining functor (“it is certain that...”, “surely...”)
to the statement “he will not answer your call now”. The message receiver is
sent the persuasion signal that he/she would better forego any attempts to
verify the truth of offered statement and trust the assurance. Why
should the assurance be trusted? It is because the person formulating
the assurance signals also his/her self-awareness: the message receiver
would obviously share this conviction if he/she partook in the sender’s
experience (knowledge).
“It is certain that people often say things they do not
truly believe in.” Again, this general judgement clearly rejects all attempts
of negation and is impermeable to all efforts to undermine its correctness or
even clarity. The foundations of this statement could be specified as follows:
“everyone is aware of this fact - from own experience and contacts with other
people”. Again, this statement refers to the mind’s reliance on self-assurance,
and characteristically declines of direct justification, which is claimed to
be redundant. The content of this statement is sufficiently clear for everyone.
All reasonable persons would also consider it significant and contributing to
the knowledge essentially necessary for individuals and the society. Yet, in a
sense, it is a non-scientific statement. Especially this (extremely natural)
formulation seems extremely non-scholarly. What is the meaning of this
“certainty outside the realm of science” or “certainty in the matter that does
not fall directly into the domain of science”? Should it be surmised that, for
some unclear reasons, scholarly research has abandoned a certain area of
rational expectations, which are both important and certain? Could it be that
the excessively obvious certainty of such judgements, i.e. their triviality,
resulted in such abdication of science. If this were the case, would it not be
honest to undertake the effort aiming at the listing or classification of
resulting consequences - which need not be necessarily trivial? The
development of the strictly formal lore of mathematics had relied on the
ordering and development of a certain category of simple and certain
judgements.
“It is certain that two times two is four”. The claim of
the validity and certainty of this statement is individually legitimised in
the act of consciousness in which the summation of two and two is effectuated.
The certainty that we cherish in relation to such arithmetic thesis, and which
we can check applying our own mind faculties, again seems to have the
characteristics of the mind’s self-assurance. The mind furthers its
infallibility by finding the certainty of the truth of proposed statement as
being obvious. Even if the language proclaiming such knowledge expires, even
if the skill of translating the phrase “two plus two equals four” into any
other language is lost, the essential truth of this statement shall remain
intact. Human mind is absolutely certain of this truth. It seems that this
certainty is closely related to the conviction about correctness of the mind’s
functioning in the addition of two and two yielding four. This certainty can
be shown through such expressions of the epistemic value of the thesis “two
plus two equals four” as “true”, “evident”, “undeniable” or “certain”,
enjoying the characteristic freedom of choice. Whichever predicate is
finally used, it will fulfil the function of directing the speaker’s and the
interlocutor’s attention at the very content of mental process (or - perhaps -
a single act) in which the counting is realised. What is more, the use of the
term “certain” (or any other of above-mentioned predicates) in this case has
no persuasive function, in contrast to the empirical statements discussed in
previous sections. It is not necessary to omit, replace or simplify the
procedure of proof. The statement of the type “it is certain that two plus two
is four” is made in such conditions and circumstances that no one experiences
any doubt about its truth. It even seems that one of the functions of the term
“certain” consists in underlining this pragmatic background, this exceptional
circumstances of some conversation. Present example illustrates well our
thesis about the functional interdependence of the terms and notions defining
a given epistemic situation. This interdependence leads to the situation that
the adopted strategy of “role allocation” (through definition) to such terms
as “truth”, “evidence” or “certainty” should be evaluated from the viewpoint
of the relevance of the whole strategy, rather than the relevance of
particular terms. It means that in various concepts, which equally well
reflect the essence of cognitive situation, the definitions of truth,
certainty or evidence may be quite divergent. The philosophical concepts of
truth (certainty, evidence) have inherited this terminological instability
from the everyday language usage. The comparative analysis of the following
statements is instructive:
“I am sure that p is true, since it is evident”
“p is evident for me, since it is obviously certain”
“It is obvious for me that p is true, since it is
certain”
“It is true that p is obvious and therefore it is
certain”
“p is obviously certain, and therefore its
truthulness is undeniable”.
The analysis of the above and other similar statements
defining essentially the same situation in everyday language (which need not
be devoid of some reflective, theorising aspirations), can show us the ways
leading to particular strategic decisions related to the definitions of truth,
evidence and certainty, based on philosophical theories.
“It is certain that I am, since I think”. In the case of
this statement (let us call it cogito in short) it is not certain
whether it should be conceived as a universally valid general thesis, or a
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